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Essays
PREGNANCY AND AIDS
MARTHA A. FIELD*
In this Essay, I discuss some of the points where pregnancy and
the acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS) come together-
an intersection at which a wide range of important ethical issues ex-
ist. The subject illustrates that it is not possible to differentiate
sharply between ethical and legal issues. Even subjects that today
seem governed purely by ethical concerns can become legal issues
as enterprising lawyers find ways to raise them in lawsuits.
Pregnancy and AIDS are an odd conjunction in one sense. We
like to think of pregnancy as a happy event-and often are able to
do so. AIDS never appears in that light. But both conditions have
similar legal histories, and both may become occasions for govern-
ment to make inroads upon areas previously left to individual
choice.
In current litigation, both pregnancy and AIDS are advanced as
justifications for allowing others to make decisions for the patient.
For example, during pregnancy, others sometimes decide that a wo-
man should undergo a Caesarean-section operation because that is
safer for her fetus, or that a woman should not work in a particular
environment or lead a particular lifestyle because it might compro-
mise her fetus's development.' The AIDS issue has created a debate
about criminalizing transmission-even by punishing sexual inter-
course in some circumstances.2 Attempts have also been made to
* Professor of Law, Harvard University. This Essay is a revised version of the 1992
Stuart Rome Lecture on Law and Ethics, delivered at the University of Maryland on
April 15, 1992. Many thanks to Rebecca Winters and to Terry Perkins Mittman for ex-
cellent research assistance in connection with this Essay; and also to Dr. Robert Husson,
pediatrician specializing in infectious diseases at Children's Hospital, Boston, Massachu-
setts, for keeping me up to date on technological developments and their impact on
infant diagnosis and therapy.
1. See, e.g., International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 1196,
1210 (1991) (finding discriminatory an employer's "gender-based fetal-protection pol-
icy" and warning that "[i]t is no more appropriate for the courts than it is for individual
employers to decide whether a woman's reproductive role is more important to herself
and her family than her economic role"). See generally Martha A. Field, Controlling the
Woman to Protect the Fetus, 17 LAw, MED. & HEALTH CARE 114 (Summer 1989).
2. See generally Stephen V. Kenney, Comment, Criminalizing HIV Transmission: Lessons
from History anda Modelfor the Future, 8J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'V 245 (1992) (not-
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exclude infected individuals from schools, jobs, insurance pools,
and even to regulate living arrangements by implementing such ex-
treme approaches as quarantine.5
A particularly thorny issue where pregnancy and AIDS con-
verge involves the screening or testing of pregnant women for the
human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) .4 I take no issue with volun-
tary testing, or with making AIDS testing available to anyone who
wants it. (Any such testing should include honest counseling about
the advisability of testing and again should provide follow-up coun-
seling when the test results are in.) But some suggest that testing
should be mandatory, either for pregnant women in general or for
some subset of pregnant women.5 Indeed, even those who reject
ing that an AIDS-specific criminal statute would serve punishment and deterrence goals
but might also "exacerbate the public health crisis from AIDS"); Thomas W. Tierney,
Note, Criminalizing the Sexual Transmission of HIV" An International Analysis, 15 HASTINGS
INT'L & COMp. L. REV. 475 (1992).
3. See Wendy E. Parmet, AIDS and Quarantine: The Revival of an Archaic Doctrine, 14
HOFSTRA L. REV. 53, 53 (1985) ("An epidemic of fear has accompanied the spread of the
disease and with it, public attention has turned to quarantine, one of the oldest tools of
public health." (footnote omitted)); Edward A. Fallone, Note, Preserving the Public Health:
A Proposal to Quarantine Recalcitrant AIDS Carriers, 68 B.U. L. REv. 441 (1988). But see
David P.T. Price, Between Scylla and Charybdis: Charting a Course to Reconcile the Duty of Confi-
dentiality and the Duty to Warn in the AIDS Context, 94 DICK. L. REV. 435, 446 (1990)
("[M]ost states have shunned the quarantine option."). For a discussion of the inappro-
priateness and ineffectiveness of quarantine and criminalization in response to the AIDS
epidemic, see generally Kathleen M. Sullivan & Martha A. Field, AIDS and the Coercive
Power of the State, 23 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 139 (1988).
4. The human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) is transmitted, inter alia, by sexual in-
tercourse, blood transfusions, and by maternal transmission to a fetus or infant. The
virus manifests itself in various stages. First, it may lie dormant. A second stage, termed
AIDS-Related Complex (ARC), includes people who are symptomatic but not fully so.
Finally, there is the acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS) itself, "characterized
by HIV infection, severe immune deficiency, and a secondary illness that is potentially
fatal." See Edward N. Brandt, Jr., Health Care Workers and AIDS, 48 MD. L. REV, 1, 3-4
(1989).
5. See infra note 19 and accompanying text (detailing Florida's requirement of pre-
natal testing of pregnant women for sexually transmitted diseases, including AIDS). Cf.
Larry Gostin, Hospitals, Health Care Professionals, and AIDS: The "Right to Know" the Health
Status of Professionals and Patients, 48 MD. L. REV. 12, 13 (1989) ("The Surgeon General
has advocated HIV screening of all pre-operative patients. Some hospitals, irrespective
of what the law may allow, already screen their patients without specific informed con-
sent." (footnotes omitted)); A. Alyce Werdel, Mandatory AIDS Testing: The Legal, Ethical
and Practical Issues, 5 NOTRE DAMEJ.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 155, 219 (1990) ("Mandatory
testing is justifiable in the AIDS context because certain groups are known to be at high
risk of carrying the disease. Based on this knowledge, the state has a duty to protect
others not within these classes."). But see Taunya L. Banks, Women and AIDS-Racism,
Sexism, and Classism, 17 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 351, 370 (1989/1990) (warning
that "routine HIV prenatal screening may prompt many HIV-infected women to forego
needed prenatal care to avoid detection of their antibody status").
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mandatory testing in most circumstances may favor testing pregnant
women.
I believe that mandatory testing of pregnant women should be
avoided. Moreover, testing of newborns at birth for HIV should not
be undertaken without a parent's consent. Testing a newborn, like
testing the pregnant woman herself, reveals whether the mother is
HIV positive. Official receipt of this information suggests the fur-
ther inquiry: Should government attempt to control pregnancy in
women known to be HIV positive? Some, for example, would favor
abortion and sterilization for AIDS-infected women, or govern-
ment-supported encouragement of Norplant or Depo Provera.6
How should one distinguish between encouragement and coercion,
and is coercion permissible?
In this Essay, I review the law and the legal issues surrounding
the particular intersection of pregnancy and AIDS and analyze, from
an ethical and legal perspective, how the issues ought to be re-
solved. In general, I conclude that neither pregnancy, potential
pregnancy, nor AIDS should serve as the occasion for government
coercion.
The approach we take to the AIDS crisis, and to the regulation
of pregnancy, may affect other, larger issues. For example: To what
extent, and in what circumstances, is it permissible for government
to decide who should and who should not reproduce or parent? Are
there any circumstances where the government should encourage or
even require abortion, contraception, or sterilization? Should it go
further and adopt a licensing system for parenting, reserving permis-
sion to parent for those who can demonstrate themselves before the
fact to be fit? Could the government go so far as to criminalize preg-
nancy by unauthorized persons? And, finally, as the biotechnologi-
cal revolution continues, to what extent will government control new
reproductive possibilities and to what extent will individuals exercise
the new options?7
6. See Banks, supra note 5, at 363 n.55 (noting that one commentator has argued
"that it might be ethical to counsel women infected with HIV not to have children ...
[or] to abort"). Cf. Sandy Banisky, City Officials Planning to Promote Norplant, THE SUN
(Baltimore), Dec. 3, 1992, at IA (reporting city plan to promote use of the Norplant
contraceptive among teenagers to combat "an adolescent pregnancy rate among the
country's highest").
7. For example, as in vitro (or laboratory) fertilization becomes more widely avail-
able, ethical debates have begun to emerge. May parents select which embryo will be
implanted based on its gender? Could they select its genetic characteristics, thereby
screening out embryos having a prognosis of disability, or of being too short, or having
brown eyes? Will the state be permitted to regulate the degree to which parents can
"select" the characteristics of their future child? If the potential parent is not permitted
404 [VOL. 52:402
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Some of these inquiries seem distant from current realities. But
what we do with more immediate AIDS-related or pregnancy-re-
lated issues, like mandatory testing, may chart our course on larger
questions like these-oftentimes without adequate reflection. We
particularly need to guard against new intrusions upon individual
decision making prompted either by a panicked response to AIDS or
by political use of the AIDS epidemic.'
Our response to AIDS will be felt on many levels. The way we
respond to AIDS-related issues-for example, patients' access to
care and physicians' duty to treat-will affect our entire health care
system and its regulation. It will also affect how our constitutional
law develops, particularly in two ways: (1) how our Constitution
protects the privacy of the individual to make major life decisions, in
the face of twin onslaughts from government power and technology;
and (2) how our Constitution protects the equality of all groups
before the law. Because pregnancy and AIDS involve such difficult
and far-reaching policy and ethical issues, it is essential that our re-
sponse be a thoughtful, reflective one.
I. THE FACTS CONCERNING VERTICAL TRANSMISSION
The process of transmitting HIV from mother to child is
termed "vertical transmission." It is estimated that there are about
4000 cases of pediatric AIDS in the United States today; most in-
fants acquire the virus from their mothers through vertical transmis-
to make these determinations, will government itself be able to choose, or is no selection
permissible at all?
8. See David I. Shulman, AIDS Discrimination: Its Nature, Meaning and Function, 12
NOVA L. REV. 1113, 1115-17 (1988) (arguing that the "panic response" to AIDS is due
to the fear underlying societal taboos related to human sexuality, social stigma, helpless-
ness, mental illness, and death). One commentator has summarized the problem as
follows:
Politicians have reacted to the public's erroneous fear that AIDS is highly con-
tagious by proposing numerous legislative programs intended to prevent the
spread of the disease. Many of these proposals call for testing and quarantine
programs under circumstances the scientific community has called unwarranted
and absurd. As a result, the dangers posed by AIDS now stretch beyond its
infectious and lethal nature and extend to the threat it poses to fourth amend-
ment rights.
Bernadette P. Sadler, Comment, When Rape Victims' Rights Meet Privacy Rights: Mandatory
HIV Testing, Striking the Fourth Amendment Balance, 67 WASH. L. REV. 195, 195 (1992) (foot-
notes omitted). Many of the same points could be made about reacting to the epidemic
of crack-addicted babies by enacting legislation intended to regulate their mothers' drug
intake.
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sion.9 One out of every 800 women in this country is estimated to
be HIV positive, and women constitute about ten percent of all re-
ported AIDS cases.' ° Most of these women acquired the virus
through intravenous (IV) drug use or through sexual intercourse
with an IV drug user."
When a woman who is HIV positive becomes pregnant, there is
a thirty percent or less chance that the baby she produces will also
be infected.' 2 Interestingly, it has not been proven that there is a
greater chance of transmission if the pregnant woman actually has
AIDS and therefore has a higher level of HIV in her body.'" A
newly infected woman who is not at all ill has the same chance of
passing on the infection, even though she has a much lower level of
the virus. Indeed, some researchers theorize that the fetus is most
likely to become infected during the period when the mother first
9. See Centers for Disease Control, HIV/AIDS Surveillance Report, 39 MORBIDITY &
MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 1 (1990) (noting that transmission from mother to child ac-
counts for more than 80% of pediatric AIDS cases).
10. Centers for Disease Control National AIDS Hotline, Oct. 30, 1992. About 1800
AIDS-infected babies are born in the United States each year. Marta Gwinn et al., Preva-
lence of HIV Infection in Childbearing Women in the United States, 265 JAMA 1704 (1991).
11. See john a. powell & Eileen B. Hershenov, Hostage to the Drug War: The National
Purse, the Constitution and the Black Community, 24 U.C. DAvIs L. REV. 557, 602 (1991)
(reporting that "[miore than sixty percent of the 4,000 women in New York City thus far
diagnosed with AIDS are IV drug users"); Shawn M. Boyne, Note, Women in Prison with
AIDS: An Assault on the Constitution?, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 741, 752 (1991) (noting that
"52% of the women with the HIV virus studied in research conducted by the Centers for
Disease Control became infected through intravenous drug use").
12. Harvard AIDS Institute, Nationwide Study Investigates Perinatal Transmission of HIV,
MONTHLY REP., Sept. 1989, at 10. Estimates of the rate of transmission have decreased
over time, from about 40% in 1985, Centers for Disease Control, Heterosexual Transmis-
sion of Human T-Lymphotropic Virus Type Ill, 4 MORBIDrrY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 561
(1985), to the current figure, which some also believe is too high. The European Collab-
orative Study Group found a transmission rate of only 12.9%. European Collaborative
Study, Children Born to Women with HIV- 1 Infection: Natural History and Risk of Transmission,
337 LANCET 253 (1991). Some have theorized that the chance of transmission may in-
crease for subsequent pregnancies. See Paul H. Black & Elinor M. Levy, The HIV Seroposi-
tlive State and Progression to AIDS: An Overview of Factors Promoting Progression, 4 NEw ENG. J.
PUB. POL'Y 97, 99 (1988).
13. See William Borkowsky & Keith Krasinski, Perinatal Human Immunodeficiency Virus
Infection: Ruminations on Mechanisms of Transmission and Methods of Intervention, 90 PEDiAT-
RICS 133 (1992). The authors do suggest, however, that the presence of AIDS or HIV-
related secondary infections may increase the likelihood of transmission if these infec-
tions affect the mother's production of HIV-fighting antibodies or result in a "leaky pla-
centa." Id. Moreover, some researchers have taken the position that the rate of
transmission does increase as the mother's disease advances. See David D. Ho et al.,
Quantitation of Human Immunodeficiency Virus Type 1 in the Blood of Infected Persons, 321 NEW
ENG.J. MED. 1621 (1989).
406 [VOL. 52:402
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becomes infected. 14
It is not entirely certain how or when the vertical transmission
from pregnant woman to fetus takes place. Three different time pe-
riods are usually considered relevant-pregnancy, birthing, and
breastfeeding-and it is agreed that infection may occur at different
stages.15 Some in the medical community speculate that the earlier
the fetus is infected, the earlier the infant will develop AIDS from
the HIV infection, and the earlier the infant will die. Researchers
reason that very early transmission can result in interference with
the development of the immune system, which hampers the infant's
ability to produce her own HIV-antibodies. 16
Interestingly, one-third of infants born infected with HIV de-
velop AIDS within the first year; these infants generally die by age
three. The other two-thirds who are infected do not immediately
develop AIDS and can survive for many years. One child born with
HIV is now fifteen. 17
II. MANDATORY TESTING AND INFORMED CONSENT
The usual rule in medicine-for testing as well as for operations
and other treatments-is that the patient has the right to decide
whether to consent.'" The physician must persuade the patient to
14. See Phillip A. Pizzo & Karina M. Butler, In the Vertical Transmission of HIV, Timing
May be Everything, 325 NEW ENG. J. MED. 652, 653 (1991).
15. While information on the timing of HIV transmission is unresolved, these three
stages are the ones most commonly discussed. Some believe that most transmission
takes place during birthing. See, e.g., Susanne Lindgren et al., HIV and Childbearing:
Clinical Outcome and Aspects of Mother-to-Infant Transmission, 5 AIDS 1111 (1991); John
Modlin & Alfred Saah, Public Health and Clinical Aspects of HIV Infection and Disease in Women
and Children in the United States, in AIDS, WOMEN, AND THE NEXT GENERATION 41 (Ruth R.
Faden et al. eds., 1991); John T. Repke & Timothy R.B. Johnson, HIV Infection and Obstet-
ric Care, in AIDS, WOMEN, AND THE NEXT GENERATION, supra, at 94. Doctors Borkowsky
and Krasinski, however, state that at least 50% of all perinatal infection occurs during
gestation and, indeed, the virus has been detected in fetal material aborted as early as 18
weeks. See Borkowsky & Krasinski, supra note 13, at 133. There have been very few
cases of transmission through breastfeeding. Even in those cases, doctors do not know
if transmission occurred through the milk (which has been shown to contain the virus),
through mother's blood which was in the milk, or through mother's blood that can col-
lect around the nipple. The CDC currently recommends that HIV-positive women in
the United States not breastfeed. Telephone Interview with Mary Jo O'Hara, National
Pediatric HIV Resource Center (Oct. 21, 1992). The World Health Organization has
declined to offer the same advice, on the theory that the risks of transmission through
breastmilk are outweighed by risks of starvation without breastfeeding. Id.
16. Interview with Mary Jo O'Hara, supra note 15.
17. Id.
18. See Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 269-70 (1990) ("The
logical corollary of the doctrine of informed consent is that the patient generally pos-
sesses the right not to consent, that is, to refuse treatment."). Cf. Union Pac. Ry. v.
1993] 407
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agree to any procedure that the physician wants to perform, and the
patient retains the right to refuse. Most hospitals, physicians, and
lawmakers have adhered to that principle in the context of AIDS
testing and, for that matter, in the general context of testing preg-
nant women to detect fetal characteristics such as Down's Syn-
drome, spina bifida, and sickle cell anemia. A few statutes, however,
have imposed mandatory testing of pregnant women for AIDS.
Florida, for example, requires prenatal testing for AIDS as part of a
requirement of testing pregnant women for all sexually transmitted
diseases.19
Some hospitals also may engage in screening pregnant women,
sometimes not openly.20 Indeed, some state statutes explicitly allow
physicians to test simply on the basis of the patient's consent to
medical care, without even informing the patient that she is being
tested for HIV.2 1 In other places, courts can order testing of preg-
nant women. A Missouri statute, for example, allows courts to re-
quire testing when there "are reasonable grounds to believe that an
individual is infected with HIV and there is clear and convincing
evidence of a serious and present health threat to others posed by
Botsford, 141 U.S. 260, 261 (1891) ("No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully
guarded by the common law, than the right of every individual to the possession and
control of his own person, free from all restraint or interference of others, unless by
clear and unquestionable authority of law.").
19. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 384.23(3), 384.31 (West Supp. 1992). Similarly, a Mississippi
statute allows physicians to make medical decisions for pregnant women, rejecting their
ability to unreasonably refuse treatment. Miss. CODE ANN. § 41-41-3 (Supp. 1992).
For a discussion of the inappropriateness of including AIDS as a sexually transmit-
ted disease under these statutes, see Sullivan & Field, supra note 3, at 171-72. In New
York State Society of Surgeons v. Axelrod, 555 N.Y.S.2d 911 (1990), a group of medical
societies that favored mandatory testing sued the New York State Commissioner of
Health to have AIDS and HIV infection listed as sexually transmitted, communicable
diseases so that they would be subject to mandatory testing under existing state law.
The suit was not successful.
20. Keith Henry et al., Human Immunodeficiency Virus Antibody Testing: A Description of
Practices and Policies at U.S. Infectious Disease-Teaching Hospitals and Minnesota Hospitals, 259
JAMA 1819, 1820 (1988) (noting that 34% of all United States Infectious Disease-teach-
ing hospitals responding to a survey "estimated that the consent of the patient was
rarely obtained when an HIV antibody test was ordered"). See Gostin, supra note 5, at 36
(warning that "[w]here patients are unaware that an HIV test will be given, their consent
is fraudulently obtained" (footnote omitted)).
21. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-15-905(c) (Michie Supp. 1991) ("Informed consent,
information, and counseling are not required for the performance of an HIV test when,
in the judgment of the physician, such testing is medically indicated to provide appropri-
ate diagnosis and treatment to the subject of the test, provided that the subject of the
test has otherwise provided his or her consent to such physician for medical
treatment."),
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the individual if infected."22 But to test without consent, and
equally, to trick a woman into giving a paper "consent," is to aban-
don principles of informed consent that are basic to medical prac-
tice in this country and that many associate with individual freedom.
The Supreme Court has said that the right to make one's own medi-
cal decisions is protected by the United States Constitution.23
III. THE RIGHT NOT TO KNOW
Should someone have a right to refuse a test for HIV? After all,
no treatment is required as a result of the test-at least not yet.
Purely as a blood test, AIDS testing is not particularly intrusive.
Should people have the right to object even to learning the truth?24
One physician has called allowing "people at risk of being infected
with HIV voluntarily to choose not to know [whether they are in-
fected] a perversion of human rights and a formula for HIV
disaster."2
5
Why would anyone refuse to consent to an AIDS test? 26 There
are different types of considerations an individual might weigh
against the benefits of testing in reaching a decision. First, there
would be great and indisputable costs in having other people know
that one is HIV positive. Even in places where, in theory, a test
would be confidential, the reality may be that it is difficult to main-
tain total confidentiality once a person is found to be HIV positive.27
And some states do not even afford a pretense of confidentiality,
22. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 191.674(1) (Vernon Supp. 1992).
23. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990) ("[A] consti-
tutionally protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment may be in-
ferred from our prior decisions.").
24. This proposition assumes that the result the test reveals is correct, as it usually-
but not invariably-will be. For a discussion of the possibilities and causes of error in
testing for HIV, and a description of the types of testing required to achieve maximum
accuracy, see Martha A. Field, Testing For AIDS: Uses and Abuses, 16 AM. J. L. & MED. 33,
40-43 (1990).
25. Robert T, Jensen, HIV Testing of Pregnant Women and Newborns, 265 JAMA 1525,
Mar. 27, 1991 (letter to the editor).
26. Larry Gostin, executive director of the American Society of Law, Medicine &
Ethics, has explained, "As with many medical tests that predict grave or fatal diseases,
some patients prefer to know the information, while others do not." Gostin, supra note
5, at 37-38. Gostin further noted that the informed consent doctrine generally "lays
down a patient-oriented standard for the information that must be disclosed by the phy-
sician." Id. at 36.
27. See id. at 47 ("[B]y collecting sensitive health care data, hospitals may find them-
selves under great pressure to disclose that information. Another possibility is that the
information may be disclosed intentionally or carelessly by persons with access to medi-
cal files."). Moreover, some scholars believe it would be a mistake even to attempt to
ensure confidentiality, given the interest of other persons, such as lovers, insurers, and
1993] 409
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instead requiring physicians to inform the state health department
and then allowing the information to be subpoenaed."8 Moreover,
some insurance companies, potential employers, health mainte-
nance organizations, and others now ask applicants whether they
have ever been tested for AIDS, or whether they know if they are
HIV positive.29 Indeed Missouri's statute, for one, requires a per-
son who knows she is HIV positive to inform any health care pro-
vider of that fact prior to receiving care.3 0 It is sometimes therefore
safer-even physically safer-not to be tested for AIDS. The test
can jeopardize access to employment, health care, and housing.
In addition, there can be enormous social costs, especially for
poor women. According to the Working Group on HIV Testing of
Pregnant Women and Newborns, the extent to which HIV-positive
women suffer because of their diagnosis has not been systematically
documented, but "recent evidence suggests that poor, minority wo-
men risk the devastation of their personal and family relationships,
the loss of social and medical services, the loss of control of their
own medical decisions, and even the loss of their children."'
A different kind of reason to avoid AIDS testing-a reason
much more important to some persons than to others-is a simple
desire not to know the result. Such a reason might prevent some
persons from being tested even if the results were not to be dis-
treating physicians, in learning the information. See Harold Edgar & Hazel Sandomire,
Medical Privacy Issues in the Age of AIDS: Legislative Options, 16 AM. J.L. & MED. 155 (1990).
28. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-15-906 (Michie Supp. 1992); IDAHO CODE §§ 39-602,
606 (Michie Supp. 1991); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 191.653(3) (Vernon Supp. 1992).
29. After disclosure is made, companies may act on the information. For example, in
McGann v. H & H Music Co., 946 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 482
(1992), the court held that ERISA did not forbid an employer from changing an existing
insurance policy that otherwise provided lifetime medical benefits up to $1,000,000, to
limit lifetime coverage for AIDS-related benefits to $5000. The change was instituted
after an AIDS-afflicted employee filed claims for reimbursement. The company's desire
to avoid the expense of paying for AIDS treatment was considered a sufficient justifica-
tion. Id. at 404.
30. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 191.656(5) (Vernon Supp. 1992). Arkansas has a similar provi-
sion. ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-15-903 (Michie Supp. 1990).
31. Working Group on HIV Testing of Pregnant Women and Newborns, HIV Infec-
tion, Pregnant Women, and Newborns: A Policy Proposal for Information and Testing, 264 JAMA
2416, 2418 (1990). In one study conducted in a high-incidence area of New York City,
for example, only one-half of the women who gave birth without having received prena-
tal care agreed to submit to voluntary testing. See David Chambers, Public Policies Regard-
ing Families, in THE SOCIAL IMPACT OF AIDS 18, 19 (National Academy of Sciences 1991).
See also Banks, supra note 5, at 370 ("The stigma of a positive HIV antibody test-loss of
employment, insurance, housing, and other economic or social harm-provides another
reason for women who suspect they are infected with HIV to avoid routine prenatal
screening.").
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closed to anyone else, as would be the case at anonymous testing
sites, which are an available alternative in some states.3 2 The wish
not to know will often, though not always, be stimulated by a fear
that the result could be positive. 3 People differ greatly concerning
whether they would want to face a terrible disease. Such reactions
are not limited to AIDS, by any means.
Huntington's Disease provides another example. It is an incur-
able neurological disorder that gradually destroys the brain cells
over a period of twenty years from the onset of the illness, usually
sometime during middle age. The disease is hereditary; a person
who carries the gene for the disease has a fifty percent chance of
passing it on to her or his children. In 1986, researchers first devel-
oped a test enabling people whose parents had the gene, and who
therefore had lived with the uncertainty of knowing they had a fifty
percent chance of developing Huntington's Disease in their own
middle age, to determine whether in fact it had been passed to
them. During the first five years following the development of the
test, however, only 200 of the 125,000 persons at risk had taken the
test. Many of the persons involved agonized about whether or not
they preferred to know their actual status.3 4
A right not to know in situations like these should be seen as
part of the constitutionally protected liberty interests that the cur-
rent Supreme Court has recognized in Cruzan v. Director, Missouri De-
partment of Health " and Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania
v. Casey.3 6 The right not to know also bears a relationship to Justice
Brandeis's pivotal justification for recognizing a fundamental pri-
vacy interest in a democracy: "the makers of our Constitution...
conferred, as against the government, the right to be let alone-the
most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized
men."
37
32. For a discussion of the desirability of anonymous testing and how it works, see
Field, supra note 24, at 51-53.
33. See Gostin, supra note 5, at 52 (stating that "[situdies indicate that positive HIV
test results can cause severe psychological distress, including an increased risk of
suicide").
34. Giovanna Brea, For a Family Facing Incurable Huntington's Disease, Finding Out is Bet-
ter Than the Dread of Suspicion, TIME, Nov. 5, 1990.
35. 497 U.S. 261 (1990) (stating that a competent person has a constitutionally pro-
tected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment).
36. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992) (stating that the Constitution places limits on a state's
right to interfere with a citizen's "most basic decisions" about family, parenthood, and
bodily integrity).
37. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
1993] 411
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Whether or not exercise of this right is the "correct" approach
is another question-the answer to which might be affected by the
availability of early and effective treatment for people carrying the
virus. But whether or not the right choice seems clear, making the
choice reflects and is part of one's evolving individuality. It is the
right of personal autonomy, the right to develop such individuality,
that is at the heart of the freedom that the Fourteenth Amendment
protects.3 8 Like the decisions involved in Cruzan (the "right to
die"), Casey (the right that previability abortion not be made crimi-
nal), and Griswold v. Connecticut 9 (the right to use contraception),
deciding whether or not to know one's medical diagnosis is a subject
on which there are "intimate views with infinite variations, [which
have a] deep, personal character."4 ° Like abortion and other deci-
sions protected by Fourteenth Amendment rights to privacy and lib-
erty, these decisions involve "the most intimate and personal
choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal
dignity and autonomy. "41
Even on a more basic level, cases like Cruzan and Casey are appli-
cable here, because what is at issue is the right to make one's own
medical decisions. Whether we speak of the right to refuse medical
treatment, as in Cruzan, or the right to obtain it, as in Casey, we are
dealing with a constitutionally protected liberty interest. Mandatory
testing eviscerates a woman's right to make her own medical deci-
sions, and requires instead that she submit to medical decisions
made by the state.
The state should not be permitted to impose testing for disease,
forcing a person to confront her health status, especially when the
government has no compelling need for the information that the
test will reveal. In the case of AIDS, a positive test will fundamen-
tally and dramatically affect a mother's life without serving any com-
pelling or even important need of government. 42 Testing will not
38. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
39. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). Justice Douglas concluded his opinion by recognizing that
when the Court confronts family issues, "[w]e deal with a right of privacy older than the
Bill of Rights-older than our political parties, older than our school system." Id. at
486.
40. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2808.
41. Id. at 2807.
42. See Gostin, supra note 5, at 53 ("Compulsory screening in health care facilities...
would not be an efficacious public health policy: there is little documented risk of occu-
pational transmission; knowledge of a patient's HIV-antibody test result would be un-
likely to further decrease the already low risk; and screening would pose wholly
disproportionate psychological and social burdens on the individual, and financial bur-
dens on the [health care professional] and the health care facility.").
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prevent vertical transmission. A basic difficulty with the case for
forcing testing, or even strongly encouraging it, is that no particular
treatment may result from the diagnosis, and little direct benefit
flows from learning the result.43 Of course, that may change, and it
was truer in the past than it has been recently. Today, treatments
such as AZT and other drugs have become available that might be
helpful to the mother during or directly after pregnancy. But such
treatments are not available even to everyone who wants and needs
them; they will not necessarily follow upon a diagnosis of AIDS,
even in cases where they would be medically advisable.
IV. GOVERNMENT NEEDS AND PURPOSES
Why then does government take the position that it is better for
persons to know their status if they are HIV positive? One common
supposition is that persons will take greater precautions to avoid
spreading infection if they know they are positive than if they do
not. But that is not necessarily the case. Some people react to
learning they carry AIDS with anger at being infected and a willing-
ness or even desire to spread it to others.44 There are stories like
that of the notorious Gaetan Dugas, a Canadian airline steward also
known as Patient Zero, who reportedly told his doctors that he
would not give up unprotected sexual intercourse even though he
knew he was HIV infected.45 At the other extreme, many others
who do not know their status do take precautions-both to avoid in-
fecting themselves and to protect others from any infection they
might carry. Indeed, many believe that such an attitude of universal
precautions, to be exercised in all circumstances and without regard
to one's HIV status, is the safer approach to adopt in confronting
the AIDS dilemma. Public promotion of such an approach for all
would accomplish far more than mandatory testing-either of the
general population or of subgroups.4 6
Of course, when the subject of testing is pregnant women, gov-
ernment can argue it has purposes, and that testing has effects,
which do not exist when the test is imposed on others in the popula-
43. See Banks, supra note 5, at 369 (finding "[t]he practical value of routine HIV pre-
natal screening [to be] questionable").
44. See Marshall Forstein, Understanding the Psychological Impact of AIDS: The Other Epi-
demic, 4 NEW ENG. J. PUB. POL'Y 159, 166 (1988).
45. See Sullivan & Field, supra note 3, at 153 n.48.
46. See Field, supra note 24, at 59-60; see also Larry Gostin et al., The Case Against
Compulsory Casefinding in Controlling AIDS-Testing, Screening and Reporting, 12 AM. J.L. &
MED. 7, 20-21 (1987).
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tion. And for some, pregnancy is indeed the special case that war-
rants mandatory testing.47
The principal effect one would expect from testing pregnant
women is that those who learn they are HIV positive will consider
whether to abort. Many health professionals and others believe that
a woman should abort upon learning she is HIV positive, rather
than take the approximately thirty percent chance of giving birth to
a child who is infected.4" The woman herself may, however, see
things in a different light.49 Indeed, when a woman learns that she
has tested positive, she may look to the seventy percent chance of
having a child who is not infected as a wonderful opportunity.5" She
may be encouraged in this attitude because it does not appear that
pregnancy is harmful to the health of the HIV-positive woman.5 '
There is no evidence, then, that compelled testing will en-
courage abortion-an especially ironic state interest anyway, given
the vehemence of the government's effort to discourage abortion in
other contexts. As long as there continue to be no significant thera-
pies or treatments for improving the life of the fetus or mother-to-
47. See Jensen, supra note 25. Others favor routine, but not necessarily mandatory
testing. See Marcia Angell, A Dual Approach to the AIDS Epidemic, 324 NEw ENG. J. MED.
1498, 1499 (1991).
48. The CDC, for example, has long taken the position that HIV-positive women
should "delay" pregnancy. Centers for Disease Control, Recommendations for Assisting in
the Prevention of Perinatal Transmission of Human T-Lymphotropic Virus Type
lI/Lymphadenopathy-Associated Virus and Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome, 34 MORBIDITY
& MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 721 (1985); see also Ronald Bayer, Perinatal Transmission of HIV
Infection: The Ethics of Prevention, 32 CLINICAL OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 497, 499
(1989); John D. Arras, AIDS and Reproductive Decisions: Having Children in Fear and Trem-
bling, 68 MILBANK Q. 353, 353-54 (1990).
49. Evidence suggests that HIV-positive women are not more likely to abort than
others. See Peter A. Selwyn et al., Knowledge of HIV Antibody Status and Decisions to Continue
or Terminate Pregnancy Among Intravenous Drug Users, 261 JAMA 3567 (1989).
50. Women who are HIV positive may desire to spend their final days producing a
new life, even when childbirth may result in their death. For discussions of the issues
involved when HIV-positive women consider abortion, and the different roles that race,
class, and education can play in these deliberations, see Leroy Walters, Ethical Issues in
HIV Testing During Pregnancy, in AIDS, WOMEN, AND THE NEXT GENERATION, supra note 15,
at 274, 277-278; Ruth R. Faden et al., Prenatal Screening and Pregnant Women's Attitudes
Toward the Abortion of Defective Fetuses, 77 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 288 (1987).
51. Marie Louise Newell, HIV-Infection in Pregnancy, 4 AIDS 5111, 5112 (1990). But
cf. Lindgren et al., supra note 15, at 1115 (opining that pregnancy has no effect on
asymptomatic HIV but may accelerate HIV disease). At Newark Children's Hospital,
physicians maintain that pregnancy is not dangerous to an HIV-positive woman if her T-
cell count is high enough, but if the count is below 200, pregnancy is risky to her. Tele-
phone Interview with MaryJo O'Hara, National Pediatric HIV Resource Center (Nov. 3,
1992).
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be when the pregnant woman is diagnosed as HIV positive, such
testing will remain purposeless.
One of the problems with discussing the connection between
mandatory testing and therapies that may help the pregnant woman
and her fetus is that women have, until recently, been excluded from
various AIDS studies.52 Prior to 1990, those women who were per-
mitted to participate were prohibited from being or becoming preg-
nant. Therefore, the treatment of pregnant women-either to
preserve their own health or to reduce the rate of transmission to
the fetus-was largely unexamined. In 1990, in response to criti-
cism of this clear bias, a protocol study called AIDS Clinical Trial
Group protocol was developed. Originally, the trial involved only
treating newborns with AZT because of a reluctance to administer
AZT to pregnant women. But thereafter the trial was altered so wo-
men in their third trimester of pregnancy would be given AZT, and
the infant would continue to receive the drug for six weeks after
birth.53
Women's groups harshly criticized this modification, claiming
that women were only permitted to use AZT while pregnant if inves-
tigators felt the fetus would not be harmed.54 Some elements of the
scientific community agreed that the focus of the test should be on
preserving maternal health, regardless of the effect on the fetus.
The FDA reviewed the new proposal and decided that the focus of
these tests should indeed be on women and not on risks to the fetus.
Accordingly, Clinical Protocol 076 currently enables all pregnant
participants to receive AZT. Moreover, all receive the drug
throughout their pregnancy, rather than some merely receiving a
placebo. 55 The effect of the AZT on either the woman or the fetus,
however, has not yet been conclusively determined.
52. See Ilise L. Feitshans, Confronting AIDS in the Workplace: Balancing Employment Op-
portunity and Occupational Health Under Existing Labor Laws, 1989 DET. C.L. REV. 953, 960
(noting that women "have been ignored by AIDS studies in the United States until re-
cently"); Roy G. Spece, Jr., AIDS: Due Process, Equal Protection, and the Right to Treatment, 4
ISSUES L. & MED. 283, 309 (1988) ("Women and children might be excluded from AIDS
studies because of possible tort liability concerns.").
53. See Deborah Cotton, AIDS Clinical Research and Drug Regulation, in THE SOCIAL
IMPACT OF AIDS 31, 35 (National Academy of Sciences, 1991).
54. Id. In a preliminary study of 40 women given AZT during the third trimester,
there were no cases of birth defects.
55. See FDA Clinical Protocol 076, Phase 3 Randomized Placebo Controlled Trial to Evalu-
ate the Efficacy, Safety and Tolerance of Oral AZT in Pregnant HIV-Infected Women and Their
Infants (19xx). (As of Mar. 3, 1993, only 642 of the expected 1496 patients had been
found for the study.)
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This is not to say that if therapies develop that could benefit the
fetus-a drug that helped protect it from infection, for example-
the pregnant woman should lose her right to decide whether to con-
sent to treatment. Different issues would be posed if the therapy
appeared harmless to the pregnant woman than if it seemed risky
for her, but in either event, the mother's right to decide on appro-
priate treatment should continue unabated. A woman's right to
control medical decisions that implicate her body and her health
does not end because she is pregnant. She should be treated as an
individual in her own right, and not simply as a vessel for fetuses.
Nor should she be conceptualized as simply the conveyor of
disease. 6
Another possible scenario would exist if AZT or another drug
administered during pregnancy to HIV-positive women proved ben-
eficial to the mother but detrimental to the developing fetus. Again,
I would contend that the choice whether to proceed belongs to the
pregnant woman, and that the physician's obligation is simply to
give her full and fair information to guide her decision. But if such a
conflict between the interests of mother-to-be and developing child
were shown actually to exist, some would doubtless favor taking ac-
count of the interests of the child-to-be in order to limit the preg-
nant woman's options. In any event, such an approach is
inappropriate when no conflict between mother and child has been
demonstrated.
When medicine develops a way to put the information that the
patient is seropositive to good use-for the benefit of the patient or,
in the case of a pregnant women, of her fetus-and when that medi-
cal advance is available to the poor as well as the rich, there will be
more reason to encourage pregnant women to undergo testing. But
even then, the choice should always remain with the pregnant
woman.
V. EUGENICS
Some would argue, however, that the government's usual anti-
abortion stance is wrong, and that it should not be ashamed even to
encourage abortion when the fetus has approximately a thirty per-
cent chance of acquiring AIDS. The government would be "pro-
56. See generally Field, supra note 1 (proposing a flat rule that women not be subject to
governmental coercion because of pregnancy); Martha A. Field, Pitting the Fetus Against Its
Mother, in 1 EMERGING ISSUES IN BIOMEDICAL POLICY: AN ANNUAL REVIEW (Robert H.
Blank & Andrea L. Bonnicksen eds., 1992). See also Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pa. v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2810 (1992); In re A.C., 533 A.2d 611, 615-16 (D.C. 1987).
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tecting" the child in the odd sense that it would be preventing it
from being born, despite its seventy percent chance of being
uninfected. Such a position would also save the substantial costs,
usually borne by the government, that are associated with a child
who has been born with AIDS.57
Indeed, some would favor even greater controls. Sterilization
of HIV-positive women might also be encouraged, 58 or use of Nor-
plant (an implanted contraceptive that prevents conception for
about five years), or Depo Provera (a newly-approved and compara-
tively inexpensive contraceptive involving a shot that prevents preg-
nancy for about three months).59 And why focus simply on
encouraging abortion, sterilization, or the use of Norplant? Is there
any reason that government could not require such measures, at least
for the subset of HIV-positive women, if it is convinced that they
should not reproduce? And if government can control HIV-positive
women and prevent them from having children, then perhaps there
is, after all, a use for mandatory testing and the information it would
yield.60
57. The cost of caring for HIV-infected infants has been estimated at one billion
dollars annually. Howard L. Minkoff, AIDS in Obstetrics, 32 CLINICAL OBSTETRICS & GYN-
ECOLOGY 421 (1989).
58. See Banks, supra note 5, at 371-72 (warning that "HIV-infected women may be
coerced or directed to abort if pregnant or to be sterilized if of childbearing age"). Pro-
fessor Banks also asserted that "[a] government policy which advocates sterilization
through directive counseling of fertile HIV-infected women ... is precisely the kind of
interference with private decision making that Skinner and Roe attempt to prevent." Id.
at 379.
59. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. Recent efforts to discourage poor and
minority women from having children include the Bush administration's proposed pol-
icy of cutting off welfare for single mothers who have another child, announced in April
of 1992 with the avowed aim of improving Bush's electibility. Then-Governor Clinton
as well, during the presidential campaign, spoke of a two-year limit on welfare and indi-
cated that he would be willing to allow states to "experiment" with their welfare pro-
grams even by cutting off aid to poor women who continued to have children. See Linda
C. Rehkopf, Playing Politics of Resentment, ATLANTA CONST., Apr. 18, 1992.
The stance of the former Bush administration on "encouraging smaller families" is
especially ironic given its simultaneous campaign to deny legal abortions to poor peo-
ple. In many cases, the result of these policies will not be preventing single mothers
from having another child, but rather reducing the level of payments to her growing
family. As long ago as 1970, the Supreme Court upheld a statute that had a similar
effect on poor women. In Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970), the Court upheld
a limitation on the amount that families could receive under the Aid to Families with
Dependent Children program regardless of family size.
60. Criminalization is another method that might be employed to coerce HIV-posi-
tive women not to have babies, or to punish them if they did. While it seems almost
incredible that pregnancy could be made criminal for any subset of women, there are
criminal transmission statutes today that would seem literally applicable to pregnancy.
For example, Idaho's statute makes it a felony, punishable by up to 15 years in prison
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In this way, mandatory AIDS testing is a step in the direction of
government control of eugenics, and a step we should be reluctant
to take. It represents our government inserting itself into decisions
of reproductive choice-not in the anti-abortion stance we were
most familiar with during the Bush and Reagan administrations, but
as a promoter of abortion for reasons of cost efficiency and eugen-
ics. This is a step toward a policy, increasingly a matter of concern
as possibilities for allowing government control increase, of al-
lowing government bureaucrats and statisticians to decide who can
and who cannot parent.6 '
If persons with AIDS cannot parent, who else should be pre-
cluded? Surely drug addicts and incurable alcoholics would seem
vulnerable to control, for their habits can and do harm their off-
spring, even before birth. Should persons who have abused chil-
dren in the past also be excluded from parenting?6 2 Persons with
serious hereditary conditions such as cystic fibrosis or Huntington's
Disease, and poor people, who, after all, might not be expected to
provide as well for children as persons with a secure source of
income?
A serious question to consider in connection with mandatory
testing, then, is whether we want government participating in the
and a $5000 fine, to "expose another [to HIV] in any manner with the intent to infect."
IDAHO CODE § 39-608 (Supp. 1992). While the statute was not enacted with pregnancy
in mind, a woman could arguably be prosecuted under it if the pregnancy was intended.
The defense, of course, would be that there is, presumably, no specific intent to infect the
offspring, but only an intent to procreate. Still, a prosecutor might contend that know-
ingly exposing a fetus to the risk of HIV satisfies that element of the offense. Further,
even if the pregnancy was not intended, the woman might possibly be prosecuted on the
theory that when she continued the pregnancy knowing she was HIV positive, she satisfied
the intent requirement. Missouri's statute explicitly uses a lower mens rea requirement,
making it criminal to "deliberately create a grave and unjustifiable risk of infecting an-
other with HIV through sexual or other contact when an individual knows that he is
creating that risk." Mo. ANN. STAT. § 191.677.1 (Vernon Supp. 1992).
61. Current issues involve whether the government should license surrogacy, as the
state has traditionally done in the context of adoption, and whether the state should
regulate who may parent through artificial insemination or in vitro fertilization. The
United States government has generally avoided regulation in these areas, although the
medical profession sometimes has provided its own controls that just as substantially
limit parental choice. In other countries, Denmark for example, government limits who
may use even simple reproductive technology like artificial insemination, although there
are no government-imposed limits upon who can parent "naturally." Discussion with
Danish participants at the Seventh World Conference of the International Society on
Family Law, Motherhood and Fatherhood in a Changing Society, May 15, 1991, held at
Opatija, Yugoslavia.
62. Cf. People v. Pointer, 199 Cal. Rptr. 357 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (holding that a
condition of probation that included prohibition of conception for a woman convicted of
child endangerment was overbroad).
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abortion decision at all. In fact, this is a serious and troubling issue
even when it is only government encouragement that is contemplated.
And those who would strike the balance by favoring encouragement
but not force must further decide at what stage encouragement
slides into forbidden coercion.63
Government control could extend even beyond choosing who
may parent. Genetic studies and other analyses may be performed
on the fetus itself, and "inferior" fetuses can be flushed out, while
"superior" ones are promoted. Through so-called advances in re-
productive technology, the medical profession is achieving greater
opportunities for knowledge about, and control over, what kind of
persons will be brought into the world. Society is acquiring the op-
portunity to reduce the element of chance and replace it with plan-
ning and deliberation. Should we welcome these developments, or
are they more threatening than beneficial? Even if they do present a
welcome opportunity, how should we justly decide what types of
people to allow or to encourage?
It is an interesting exercise to take a moment to contemplate
what kind of people you would encourage if you were the decision-
maker. Linus Pauling, a nobel laureate in chemistry, found it
problematic
that the majority of donors [of semen for artificial insemi-
nation] are from a professional group [physicians] that, on
the average, may have some desirable qualities, but that...
is not the professional group that leads in intelligence (av-
erage IQ), and that failure to discuss the question of selec-
tion of donors may well be causing us to . . . reject[] an
opportunity to improve the human race in a small but nev-
ertheless significant way. 64
Pauling called for legislation setting "certain minimum standards of
health, desirable characteristics, and family history for donors. '"65
But should there be only minimum standards? And how should any
standards be chosen? Even if "intelligence" could be gauged,
would that be the right measure? Happiness, or perhaps generosity,
might be preferable, although we would have to research and de-
63. See supra note 62 and accompanying text. If the prohibition against conception
had not been overturned on appeal and Pointer became pregnant, could the state have
insisted on abortion?
64. Linus Pauling, Reflections on the New Biology, 15 UCLA L. REv. 267, 271-72 (1968).
Pauling's comment on the medical profession was drawn from an observation of Her-
mann Muller.
65. Id. at 272.
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bate whether those characteristics have any genetic component.
Others doubtless will think of other characteristics they consider
more important still.
These issues concerning positive eugenics may still seem re-
mote today. Negative eugenics-eliminating the "unfit"-is, how-
ever, part of the current landscape.66 For nearly two decades,
controversy has raged over elimination of newborns who have disa-
bilities.67 The issue usually posed is whether parents have the right
to decide not to provide treatment, on the theory that the child will
have a poor quality of life and is essentially "better off dead." Dur-
ing the Reagan administration, the White House attempted to elimi-
nate parental and medical discretion not to treat a newborn for
reason of its disability,68 a move that was only partially successful.6 9
In other ways, however, government has encouraged elimina-
tion of newborns with handicaps. It has promoted prenatal diagno-
sis of some disabilities, especially those associated with mental
retardation, by funding amniocentesis.7" Moreover, public funds
have been available for abortion more readily when the fetus is
66. See John R. Harding, Jr., Beyond Abortion: Human Genetics and the New Eugenics, 18
PEPP. L. REV. 471, 478 (1991) (explaining that "[niegative eugenics seeks to reduce or
eliminate deleterious genes, while positive eugenics encourages desirable or superior
traits").
67. See generally Martha A. Field, Killing "the Handicapped," 16 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. -
(forthcoming 1993).
68. The Reagan administration's Baby Doe guidelines tried to accomplish this by
applying § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C.A. § 794 (West Supp. 1988),
to the treatment of newborns with handicaps. See Discriminating Against the Handi-
capped by Withholding Treatment or Nourishment; Notice of Health Care Providers, 47
Fed. Reg. 26,027 (1982); Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Handicap, Interim Final
Rule, 48 Fed. Reg. 9630 (1983) (invalidated by American Academy of Pediatrics v. Heck-
ler, 561 F. Supp. 395 (D.D.C. 1983)); Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Handicap; Pro-
cedures and Guidelines Relating to Health Care for Handicapped Infants, 49 Fed. Reg.
1622 (1984) (invalidated on technical administrative law grounds by Bowen v. American
Hosp. Ass'n, 476 U.S. 610 (1986)). For a thorough discussion of the Reagan Guidelines,
see U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, MEDICAL DISCRIMINATION AGAINST CHILDREN WITH
DISABILITIES 61-78 (1989). The Child Abuse Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-457,
and its implementing regulations, see 50 Fed. Reg. 14,878, extended and amended the
Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act of 1978, to cover denial of medical treat-
ment to disabled infants.
69. See U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 68, at 103-10 (finding a "likelihood
of widespread denials of lifesaving treatment to children with disabilities that have con-
tinued since implementation of the Child Abuse Amendments of 1984 [supra note 68] on
October 1, 1985").
70. One recent study found that all 50 states pay for amniocentesis through their
Medicaid programs. Study Tracks Medicaid Payments for Abortions, MOD. HEALTHCARE, June
4, 1990, at 12, 14.
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handicapped. 7'
Even though the United States government has not required
abortion when prenatal testing shows that the fetus will have disabil-
ities, the steps it has taken to encourage prenatal diagnosis and
abortion cross the line forbidding government interference in re-
productive choice through encouragement of abortion. Our gov-
ernment has also thereby discriminated against persons who have
disabilities, in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment 72 and the Americans with Disabilities Act.73 But
although I consider such government conduct illegal and unconsti-
tutional, it is widely practiced and has been little challenged to
date.74
One issue therefore is whether government should ever get in-
volved in reproductive control, either for the purpose of producing
persons who are genetically "better," or in order to eliminate those
it considers least fit. Moreover, if wholesale governmental involve-
71. By labeling abortion for disability as "medically necessary"-defined to include
those where "the fetus is physically deformed, mentally deficient, or afflicted with a con-
genital illness"-Iowa provides otherwise unavailable funding to cover such abortions.
1991 Iowa Legis. Serv. 270 § 103 (West). Virginia pays for abortions through its state
medical assistance fund when "the fetus will be born with a gross and totally incapacitat-
ing physical deformity or with a gross and totally incapacitating mental deficiency." VA.
CODE ANN. § 32.1-92.2 (Michie 1982). Similar provisions have been proposed, but not
yet passed, by several other state legislative bodies. See, e.g., 1991 Mo. H.B. 75 (author-
izing Medicaid payment for abortion when there is "severe fetal deformity" or when the
pregnant woman tests positive for HIV); 1991 Tenn. H.B. 1522. A 1988 study predating
the Iowa law found that 13 states paid for abortion for fetal handicap. See Study Tracks
Medicaid Payments for Abortions, supra note 70.
72. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
73. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (Supp. I 1990). See Field, supra note 67.
74. Indeed, more persons have objected to government restrictions on the ability to
abort fetuses deemed disabled than to government encouragement of abortion in this
context. Some have argued that a state that bans postviability abortion must nonethe-
less make an exception when the pregnant woman learns her fetus will have a serious
disability and that such a woman has a constitutional right to abort and to choose not to
have a disabled child. See Curt S. Rush, Note, Genetic Screening, Eugenic Abortion, and Roe
v. Wade: How Viable is Roe's Viability Standard?, 50 BROOK. L. REV. 113, 142 (1983). My
position, by contrast, is that the state cannot permissibly make abortion for disability any
easier to obtain than any other elective abortion, and that to do so violates both the
Equal Protection Clause and the Americans with Disabilities Act. Field, supra note 73.
This position would invalidate even rather common statutory rules allowing abortion for
"fetal deformity." While the position was crafted with other disabilities in mind, it sug-
gests as well that any rules making it easier to abort HIV-infected fetuses than others
would be unconstitutional; if government wants women to be allowed to abort because
they are HIV positive, it must make elective abortion available to all. Only in those cases
where the pregnancy poses a risk to the health of the mother-to-be, see supra text accom-
panying notes 54-56, should the abortion be considered a "therapeutic" one that must
be available to the pregnant woman.
1993]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
ment is eschewed and few are to be encouraged or forced to abort,
why should AIDS-infected women be the group that is controlled?
After all, a person in that group has a seventy percent chance of
having a noninfected baby. Furthermore, she may have a partner
who is willing and able to provide well for their offspring, even when
she becomes ill or dies.
VI. THE INEFFICACY OF MANDATORY CONTROLS
Even apart from issues of the rights of the women who would
be tested, a powerful argument against imposing testing on particu-
lar groups, like pregnant women, is that testing will not work to slow
the spread of HIV, or to accomplish any other legitimate govern-
ment purpose. Not only is universal precautions a more effective
approach than the vain effort to sort the population into infected
and uninfected segments, but also the attempt to impose testing on
women who do not want it will be counterproductive. If forced test-
ing becomes part of prenatal care, it will drive pregnant women who
do not want to be tested away from the other components of prena-
tal care as well. They will be less able to make intelligent decisions
during pregnancy and protect the health of their potential off-
spring.75 If testing is a condition of admission to the hospital, when
women learn of that fact, then women who do not want to be tested
will simply give birth elsewhere under less safe conditions.
Indeed, money spent on imposing mandatory testing could be
put to much better use by providing free prenatal care for women
who cannot otherwise obtain it, and on developing other prenatal
health strategies.7 6 Such steps would do far more to protect the
health of the next generation than mandatory testing of pregnant
women ever could.
Accordingly, it is difficult to justify imposing testing-either
upon pregnant women, or upon other populations that might be
targeted. Even apart from any civil liberties concerns, forced testing
is a misuse of resources and is counterproductive. In deciding
whether to impose testing, society is not choosing between the public
health and our civil liberties, although the issue is often so framed
75. See Banks, supra note 5, at 370-72.
76. In other contexts, screening infants for diseases has actually thwarted continued
research on the disease, as public funds were channeled instead into the testing. See
Katharine L. Acuff & Ruth R. Faden, A History of Prenatal and Newborn Screening Programs:
Lessonsfor the Future, in AIDS, WOMEN, AND THE NEXT GENERATION, supra note 15, at 59, 66
(discussing effects of mandatory screening programs for syphilis, PKU, sickle cell dis-
ease, Tay-Sachs, neural tube defects, and Hepatitis B).
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by proponents of coercive controls. Both public health and civil lib-
erties are harmed by coercive state action. In addition to the futility
of mandatory controls, the threats to civil liberties are enormous.
These range from abandoning informed consent and coercing med-
ical testing or treatment, to making special regulations to govern
AIDS, and to promulgating special rules to govern pregnant wo-
men, to name but a few of the varied possibilities.77 The threats
loom even larger when one bears in mind the slippery slope that
exists, not only between the different groups of people who might
be subjected'to AIDS testing, but also concerning the variety of con-
ditions or traits that might be tested for-or even forcibly treated.78
The right time to cut off this movement toward coercive gov-
ernmental decision making, and the concurrent loss of individual
decision making, is at the outset. Individuals should not be subject
to coercion concerning medical decisions-no individuals. 79 Nor
should AIDS or pregnancy be the occasion for special coercive legal
rules.
VII. TESTING THE NEWBORN
Even if the pregnant woman's right not to know does protect
her from having testing forced upon her, the issue of whether she
can prevent the testing of her newborn at birth still remains. One
consequence of the test will be that it reveals her HIV status. In fact,
testing the mother is the only immediate effect of tests performed
77. See generally Gostin, supra note 5, at 35-42. Professor Gostin concluded:
[T]he justifications for fully informed consent to HIV testing, then, are that it
respects a patient's autonomy and privacy in law, it complies with the well-ac-
cepted clinical standards of care, and it maintains the ethical integrity of the
medical profession and the dignity and worth of the patient.
Id. at 42.
78. For the moment, most fetal conditions that can be detected are either not treata-
ble during pregnancy, or treatment is highly experimental and, accordingly, could not
be forced upon a woman who declined to consent to it. But unless the law embodies
principles protecting women's rights to make their own medical decisions during preg-
nancy, such women may become subject to forced operations as science develops ways
to treat the fetus in utero. Society should be able to develop medical knowledge and the
opportunity for the treatment of fetuses without thereby coercing women to submit to it.
79. What about "the incompetent"? I believe far too many individuals are consid-
ered to be in that category and that more persons should have control of more of their
own decisions. However, there are some who cannot in any way understand the deci-
sions being made or express any preference. Whether the state or a substitute decision-
maker should then have control of the decision is a matter of hot dispute. See Conserva-
torship of Valerie N., 707 P.2d 760 (Cal. 1985) (en banc) (holding that a state law bar-
ring sterilization of persons under a conservatorship impermissibly interfered with their
privacy and liberty interests).
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shortly after birth. All babies born of HIV-positive mothers test
positive for the virus at birth,80 even though less than a third of
them will ultimately prove to be infected.
The only tests much in use until very recently check for the
presence of HIV-related antibodies in the individual's blood. Dur-
ing the third trimester of pregnancy, however, the mother transmits
her antibodies to the fetus in order to provide it with the protection
from infection it will need once born. These antibodies remain in
the infant for as long as fifteen to twenty-four months after birth.
Therefore, a test for this antibody in the infant (usually the enzyme-
linked immunosorbent assay or ELISA test) will be positive until the
mother's antibodies disappear. Under that test, the infant will test
positive at birth and for approximately a year and a half thereafter,
regardless of whether the infant is one of the thirty percent actually
infected with the virus.8"
Recently, several tests have been developed that can determine
much earlier whether an infant has the virus, although still not relia-
bly until a few months after birth.8 2 Current technology is develop-
80. See Martha M. Curley, Note, Establishing Relieffor the Most Innocent of All AIDS Vic-
tims: Liability for Perinatal Transmission of AIDS, 28J. FAM. L. 271, 275 (1989/1990) ("An-
tibodies are transmitted to the fetus in every case, and half of the babies who test
positive to HIV are born with visible signs of clinical illness.").
81. See Field, supra note 24, at 98-99.
82. There are currently several other kinds of tests-for markers other than HIV
seropositivity. They still cannot detect whether the infant has the virus immediately af-
ter birth, but they can as early as three to six months.
First, the HIV Culture Test works by extracting blood from the infant and then using
this blood to attempt to grow the virus. If the virus is detected, the infant is infected.
(The specificity of the culture is almost 100%.) If the result is negative, however, there
is still at least a 5-10% chance that the infant may be infected. When this culture is taken
at birth, the sensitivity drops to less than 50%. Moreover, results are generally not avail-
able for two or three weeks, because it takes that long to grow the virus. The chief
problems with the HIV Culture Test are this time lag and its expense.
A second test, called the Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR), works by determining
whether or not viral DNA exists in the infant's blood; if viral DNA is detected, the child
is almost certainly infected, as long as the test has been performed in an experienced
laboratory. This test also is usually conducted when the infant is three to six months
old. Like the HIV Culture, it is less sensitive during the first few months of life but
highly sensitive (greater than 90%) by three to six months of age. The PCR is quicker to
perform than the HIV culture; the results can be obtained within forty-eight hours. Be-
cause samples are often batched, however, the turnaround time is typically several days.
The PCR is likely soon to become the preferred method of early diagnosis. It is
already becoming more widely used and can be performed by some commercial labora-
tories. Within the year, a kit for HIV diagnosis using PCR is likely to be available.
The P-24 Antigen Test is a third test. It works by looking at the infant's blood for the
presence of P-24, a protein component of HIV. This test is limited by rare false positive
results that can occur in the first few weeks after birth, and by its low sensitivity. A
recent modification of the P-24 Test has significantly improved the test's sensitivity,
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ing rapidly. At present, nearly all infected infants can be identified
by the time they are three to six months old.83 Moreover, the new
types of tests-once both prohibitively expensive and capable of be-
ing performed only at a limited number of laboratories-are becom-
ing more generally available. Unless an infant has received a
transfusion or another procedure that could have transmitted the
HIV virus, these tests will still have the effect of indirectly revealing
the HIV status of the mother. (Fewer mothers will be shown to be
positive than previously, because only the infants actually infected
will test positive, so the status of only about thirty percent of the
mothers who are themselves positive will be revealed.)
Some would require the testing of newborns even during the
period when the test would disclose only the mother's HIV status (a
period ranging from the first three months to the first fifteen
months of the child's life, depending on the test utilized). After all,
the arguments for the mother's bodily integrity and for her right to
decide her own medical course, which weighed toward deferring to
her during pregnancy, no longer apply after the child is born. The
mother is no longer the one on whom the test will be performed.
But the right a mother has traditionally had that does require
deference to her at this stage is her right to decide upon the medical
treatment of her child.8 4 Usually parents are asked to consent to
medical procedures performed on an infant, and physicians who
treat children without parental consent expose themselves to liabil-
without apparent loss of specificity. See Steven A. Miles et al., Rapid Serologic Testing with
Immune-Complex-Dissociated HIV p24 Antigen for Early Detection of HIV Infection in Neonates,
328 NEw ENG. J. MED. 297 (1993).
Another test, called the IGA Antibody Test, works by detecting a particular type of
antibody which the infant herself will begin to develop to combat the virus; it is an an-
tibody that does not cross the placenta. This test is hopeful because it can be easily
performed at commercial laboratories-rather than only at university research facili-
ties-and can be performed more inexpensively than the others. The test is not useful
before six months of age, however. Though IGA detection is very specific, it is also
highly insensitive in the first few months of life. Interview with Mary Jo O'Hara, supra
note 15; Conversations with Dr. Robert Husson, Children's Hospital, Boston, MA, Feb.
1993.
83. See Conversations with Dr. Husson, supra note 82.
84. If the father is involved in the decision-making process and he disagrees with the
mother, the state might accept his consent in place of the mother's in order to test and
protect the child. See Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 454 (1990) (stating that "[i]n
virtually every state, the consent of one parent is enough ... to submit [a child] to any
medical or surgical procedure other than an abortion" and to permit the child to partici-
pate as a subject in most forms of medical research); see also 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.404-05
(1988).
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ity."5 A parental refusal to consent to a proposed medical proce-
dure will be overridden only if the procedure is greatly needed by
the infant and the withholding of parental consent is highly
unreasonable. s6
Proponents of AIDS testing of newborns, however, point to
mandatory programs for screening newborns for phenylketonuria
(PKU), which are widely accepted. Parental consent has not always
been considered necessary for PKU screening. PKU is a hereditary
metabolic disorder that has an incidence of approximately 1 in
12,000 to 15,000 live births." It is characterized by the develop-
ment of severe mental retardation; ninety-five percent of those af-
fected have IQs of less than fifty. Unlike HIV, PKU is not fatal; nor
is it transmitted vertically.
Most significantly, unlike HIV, early treatment of PKU actually
prevents the development of retardation in ninety-five percent of
the infants treated.8" Moreover, the treatment is comparatively sim-
ple. It involves restricting the infant's intake of phenylalanine
(found in a few foods, like fava beans) beginning before the infant is
four weeks old. Given the low cost, safety, and accuracy of the PKU
test, as well as the availability of very simple and effective treatment
for this disease, forty-three states established mandatory testing
programs during the decade following the development of PKU
testing.89
85. Bonner v. Moran, 126 F.2d 121, 122-23 (D.C. Cir. 1941) (remanding an assault
and battery action for new trial so that the jury could be instructed that the consent of a
parent, not that of her 15-year-old son, was necessary before the defendant plastic sur-
geon could legally remove a skin patch from the son for the benefit of his cousin).
86. See, e.g., State v. Perricone, 181 A.2d 751, 759 (N.J. 1962) (finding that while the
"appellants evidenced sincere parental concern and affection for their child [,]... courts
have held that the refusal of parents, on religious grounds, to submit their infant child to
a blood transfusion necessary to save its life or mental health amounted to statutory
neglect"), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 890 (1962); People ex rel. Wallace v. Labrenz, 104 N.E.2d
769, 774 (Ill. 1952) ("Neglect . . . is the failure to exercise the care that the circum-
stances justly demand. It embraces wilful as well as unintentional disregard of duty."),
cert. denied, 344 U.S. 824 (1952).
87. See Lori B. Andrews, Torts and the Double Helix: Malpractice Liability for Failure to
Warn of Genetic Risks, 29 Hous. L. REV. 149, 168 (1992) (noting that "all states have
newborn screening programs which screen every infant for phenylketonuria" and reiter-
ating the risk of the disorder actually striking any particular child as, at most, 1 in
12,000).
88. See Acuff & Faden, supra note 76, at 64.
89. Id. at 65. The first state to begin a voluntary screening program was Massachu-
setts. That early effort was very successful. Yet, in spite of the widespread testing that
was conducted during the voluntary regime, Massachusetts was also the first state to
adopt a mandatory screening program, due largely to pressure from the National Asso-
ciation for Retarded Children and certain state health officials.
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In many respects, PKU screening serves as the paradigm for a
procedure to which parents cannot effectively withhold consent.
Early treatment is simple and works to eliminate the harm associ-
ated with the disease, while nontreatment of the infected child re-
sults in a near-certainty of serious disability.
It is a much more difficult judgment whether AIDS testing, on
the other hand, satisfies requirements for overriding parental re-
fusal of consent. The current balance of benefits and burdens that
will result from a mandatory test suggests that it is still reasonable
for a parent to refuse AIDS testing and early treatment-more rea-
sonable than it would be in the case of PKU.
As benefits of early knowledge of HIV status increase, many
more mothers will consent voluntarily to testing, as long as care is
available for their children. When therapy is both effective and
available, society will have to face the question whether denial of the
medical benefits that would result from testing is abusive, so that
parents are not permitted to deny consent.90 We are not yet there,
in terms of either effectiveness or availability of therapy, but there
are more benefits from early detection than there were a few years
ago.
In making judgments about how reasonable it is for parents to
refuse consent to testing, it is important to weigh in negative social
and economic effects of learning HIV-positive status. We also must
differentiate between the period, shrinking though it is, in which the
test will reveal only the mother's HIV-infection status and the pe-
riod when the infant's own status can be tested. The important dif-
ference is that, as a group, newborns who test positive during the first
period (about seventy percent of whom are not really infected) will
not benefit from aggressive treatment from birth. Indeed, AZT-
the most frequently used treatment for AIDS-can cause severe
toxic effects. 9 ' Thus, it is both dangerous and wholly without bene-
fit to those infants who are not infected but still test positive.
Part of the puzzle about whether HIV-positive parents should
be compelled to consent either to testing or to immediate treatment
90. And if consent to testing is to be forced, should it be forced upon all parents of
newborns-or only on women known to be HIV positive? See infra Part IX.
91. See Douglas D. Richman et al., The Toxicity of Azidothymidine (AZT) in the Treatment of
Patients with AIDS and AIDS-Related Complex: A Double-Blind, Placebo-Controlled Trial, 317
NEW ENG. J. MED. 192, 193 (1987) (finding treatment-associated toxic effects, including
nausea, headaches, myalgins, and anemia); Rhoda S. Sperling et al., A Survey of Zidovudine
Use in Pregnant Women with Human Immunodeficiency Virus Infection, 326 NEw ENG. J. MED.
857 (1992). Cf. Tierney, supra note 2, at 482 (noting that "people taking AZT often
show increasing viral resistance to the drug").
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for their newborns is the traditional position of our legal and medi-
cal systems that parents should not even be able to consent to medi-
cal procedures to be performed on their child when any expected
benefit is not really for the child herself. It is considered inappro-
priate to use the child for the benefit of another person or for the
benefit of society as a whole.92 Adults can and often do consent on
their own behalf to be research subjects out of altruistic motives-or
to donate bone marrow or a kidney to a loved one-but it is much
more troublesome when a parent agrees for her child to be so
used.93
But the relevance of that doctrine is not obvious in the context
of neonates with HIV-positive mothers. There is, after all, a thirty
percent chance that the child will benefit from current treatment.
Perhaps the uncertainty and the gambling character of whatever de-
cision is made during this period suggest the wisdom of adhering to
traditional practice and deferring to parental discretion.
In 1990, one set of authors summarized the balance of consid-
erations thus:
Currently, and for the foreseeable future, programs of
newborn screening are de facto programs testing for HIV
92. For a sampling of the debate surrounding this issue, see generally PAUL RAMSEY,
THE PATIENT AS PERSON 14-15 (1970) (arguing that while no one should be able to give
consent for a child to undergo "[niontherapeutic, nondiagnostic experimentation," par-
ents may have consented to Salk polio vaccine testing of a healthy child because it was a
potentially "therapeutic" procedure used to combat "epidemic conditions"); Richard
McCormick, Proxy Consent in the Experimental Situation, in 18 PERSPECTIVES IN BIOLOGY AND
MEDICINE 2, 14 (Autumn 1974) (maintaining that "when a particular experiment would
involve no discernible risks, no notable pain, no notable inconvenience, and yet hold
promise of considerable benefit," vicarious consent is permissible. But consider that,
under this analysis, parental consent to a kidney transplant from one three-year-old to
another lacks moral justification). See also Charles Fried, Children as Subjects for Medical
Experimentation, in RESEARCH ON CHILDREN 107 (J. van Eys ed., 1978); Additional Protec-
tions for Children Involved as Subjects in Research, 48 Fed. Reg. 9814 (1983) (discuss-
ing regulations governing research on children).
93. See Curran v. Bosze, 566 N.E.2d 1319 (Ill. 1990) (surveying decisions of several
states regarding whether consent by court, parent, or guardian to the removal of a kid-
ney from a child or an incompetent person for transplantation to a sibling is legally
effective, and finding that the key inquiry is whether or not such removal is in the do-
nor's best interest). The position taken in Curran is not necessarily decisive in the AIDS
context, though. A parent might decide that testing may be of some benefit to her child
since her child does have a 30% chance of being infected. The parent might reason that
the benefit that would adhere if this 30% probability became a reality outweighs the
harms that would occur if the child were not infected. It is the significance of these
opposing factors that makes the parent's decision a reasonable one whatever she de-
cides, and prevents such parental choices from being overridden. If the parental motive
were purely altruistic, and without possible benefit to the child, parental consent would
probably not be considered legitimate.
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infection in the mother, not the infant... [N]ewborns and
their mothers are a family unit; when HIV-infected mothers
experience social or institutional discrimination, their in-
fants suffer as well. Human immunodeficiency virus-posi-
tive newborns-70% of whom are not themselves
infected-face the further risk of being abandoned by their
mothers, difficulties with adoption and foster home place-
ments, and difficulties in access to day care.
At present, the expected benefits to newborns from
HIV testing do not clearly outweigh these risks or the pri-
vacy and autonomy interests of their mothers. Although
there are few experimental data on this point, we are per-
suaded that for the approximately 30% of newborns who
are infected, the prospects for medical benefits are signifi-
cant and would be enhanced by early identification of "at
risk" status. Currently available benefits include the pre-
vention or delay of death through Pneumocystis carini pneu-
monia prophylaxis and the prospect that antiviral
treatment may lengthen and improve the quality of life,
particularly with regard to cognitive development. How-
ever, for the approximately 70% of newborns who would
be identified as being at increased risk because maternal
antibodies are detected but who turn out not to be in-
fected, the benefit-to-harm calculus may well tip in the op-
posite direction. For both groups of newborns, access to
adequate medical care is by no means guaranteed. Where
the interests of newborns are so difficult to discern and
evaluate, there is no moral justification for substituting the
judgment of the state or the health professional for that of
the parent.94
But even at that early date, some balanced the risks differently.
At least one state provided by statute that parental consent rules
change when HIV is at issue. In 1989, Rhode Island enacted a law
providing that, despite its requirement of particularized informed
consent for HIV testing in most settings, an HIV test may be per-
formed at the discretion of the health care provider on any patient
less than one year old without any consent.95 North Carolina allows
such testing but only when a "parent or guardian has refused to
consent to such testing and there is reasonable suspicion that the
minor has AIDS virus or HIV infection or that the child has been
94. Working Group on HIV Testing of Pregnant Women and Newborns, supra note
31, at 2418-19.
95. See R.I. GEN. LAws § 23-6-14(a) (1989).
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sexually abused." 96
Even if it is accepted that parents have discretion to refuse con-
sent to testing or treatment during the period when it is not possible
to tell whether the particular infant is actually infected, the dilemma
becomes more difficult when the child can be accurately tested for
her own status. Perhaps the most crucial variable bearing upon the
reasonableness of a parent's refusal to consent even at this stage is
the degree of medical benefit that will flow from the intervention.
Not only advances in diagnosis but also advances in therapy have
been occurring rapidly.
Today we know there are clear benefits to neonates from early
detection and treatment. More early therapy is administered than in
the past. Asymptomatic infants do not receive AZT,97 but infected
infants with below age-normal T-4 cell counts usually are treated
with AZT.98 Moreover most infants born to women known to be
HIV infected are given different types of inoculations than other
children, and their T-cell count is monitored regularly. These treat-
ments carry little risk to infants who are not in fact HIV positive
while they benefit those who are infected.
In addition, most infants born to women known to be HIV in-
fected do receive Bactrim, an antibiotic, until the HIV-infection sta-
tus and immune status of the infant are determined. The purpose is
to help those who are infected ward off pneumocystis pneumonia
(PCP). This type of pneumonia is the major lethal complication of
pediatric HIV infection. An ethical dilemma concerning mandatory
testing does exist because PCP is highly preventable with treatment,
but treatment is only administered when the mother or child is iden-
tified as HIV infected. Moreover PCP prophylaxis seems clearly
sound and beneficial. Improved neurologic function has clearly
been demonstrated in response to antiretroviral treatment. Most
agree that antiretroviral therapy prolongs life and prolongs the pe-
riod without disease in asymptomatic adults. Measurable effects of
AZT have been the same in children as in adults, although placebo-
controlled trials in children have not been done (and will not be).99
96. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130A-148(h) (1989 & Supp. 1991). See also LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 40:1300:13(F)(6) (West Supp. 1992) (allowing testing of children without paren-
tal consent when the attending physician deems it necessary to properly diagnose or
treat the child).
97. See supra notes 53-55 for a discussion of FDA Clinical Protocol 076, in which
infants born of HIV-infected women do receive AZT for the first six weeks of life.
98. See Conversations with Dr. Husson, supra note 82.
99. Id.
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These facts about available therapies increase pressure to cut
off the requirement that parents consent before identified testing
occurs. The availability of therapy makes decisions about
mandatory testing more difficult than they were a few years ago.
Moreover, the balance of advantages may change rapidly. At some
point the medical profession may be able to demonstrate that the
clear benefits available to the child who tests positive outweigh the
economic and societal disadvantages that such a diagnosis may im-
pose upon him. Certainly, if treatment options develop so that rea-
sonable persons would not differ as to whether it was to the clear
advantage of the child to know her status and proceed with available
treatment, parents might not be permitted to block testing and re-
sulting treatment,'0 0 just as they cannot block PKU testing. But we
have not yet arrived at that scenario.
As long as reasonable persons can differ as to the proper course
of treatment, the state should not intrude on the decisions of par-
ents. It is important to note that it is a reasonable decision that is
required here-not the reasonable one, or the one that seems best.
The decision need only be within the realm of rational choice, for
the parent's choice to be followed. It is only in extreme circum-
stances that government choice replaces parental choice. Pediatric
AIDS is a serious problem and needs to be combated, but this fact
should not be used to make inroads upon our longstanding rules
concerning parental authority. Today the medical benefits deriving
from testing are not so compelling that a parental decision not to
take the risks involved is an abusive decision, warranting forcible
displacement of parental authority under prevailing principles of
child abuse.
VIII. DEVELOPING APPROPRIATE TREATMENTS
In part because parental refusal of consent is so reasonable, it has
been difficult to develop conclusive information about which treat-
ments will be beneficial to newborns. It is crucial to know both what
will help those who are infected and which procedures will be harm-
100. Most courts have refused to intervene to override parental objections when the
health problem at issue is not life threatening. Compare In re Seiferth, 127 N.E.2d 820,
823 (N.Y. 1955) (finding that a court "has power in drastic situations to direct [an] opera-
tion over the objection of parents" (emphasis added)) with In re Sampson, 317 N.Y.S.2d
641,654 (N.Y. Fain. Ct. 1970) (concluding that the court's power is not limited to "dras-
tic situations"), aft'd, 328 N.Y.S.2d 686 (1972). Similarly, an advantage that comes to
the child from treatment but that will not actually save or very significantly prolong the
child's life might not be considered significant enough to warrant the extraordinary step
of overriding parental consent.
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ful to the seventy percent who are seropositive but not in fact in-
fected. Moreover, we need to develop knowledge and strategies to
avoid those harms.
Without testing and experimentation on newborns and their
use as research subjects, it is difficult for drugs to be approved for
infants. And if the drugs are not approved, doctors may risk per-
sonal liability in prescribing those drugs for infants, even if parental
consent has been given. Without such experimentation, it is difficult
to accumulate medical knowledge that could be beneficial to such
children. The research already done in the AIDS area involves pri-
marily gay, white, adult males, and may or may not be applicable in
this very different context.
Today many children are enrolled in clinical trials concerning
treatment for HIV. Better medical treatment is expected to develop
as a result, which will benefit seropositive infants as a group. None-
theless, a reluctance to experiment with newborns or to consent to
yet-untried treatments on one's own child is extremely understanda-
ble and is well within parental authority.101
Developing appropriate drug treatments and other therapies
for infants poses yet another ethical dilemma. Many children who
test positive for HIV are abandoned or orphaned and then are
placed in group homes or in foster care. Often the state acts in loco
parentis for these children. Should the government be permitted to
consent to aggressive treatment of those children? One advantage
is development of more information on the proper medical course
for seropositive children. However, there are obvious objections to
government harvesting a population of research subjects by way of
the foster care system. Drug testing using children as subjects must
not be limited to or consist primarily of this group of children, as
might occur with broad governmental consent for its wards. Cer-
tainly, during the period when there is a seventy percent chance that
101. Similarly, comparatively little research has been done on the effect of various
treatments on HIV-positive pregnant women because of a reluctance to experiment at a
time when the fetus might be harmed and when medical personnel might subject them-
selves to liability. On current efforts to include consenting pregnant women in more
clinical trials, especially those involving drugs that might prevent transmission of the
virus to the fetus, see Deborah Cotton, AIDS, Clinical Research and Drug Regulation
(work in progress for the National Academy of Sciences Panel on the Social Impact of
AIDS).
For an excellent discussion of the myriad ways in which the needs of women, preg-
nant or not, in relation to the AIDS epidemic have been neglected, see Nan D. Hunter,
Complications of Gender: Women and HIV Disease, in AIDS AGENDA EMERGING ISSUES IN
CIVIL RIGHTS 5 (Nan D. Hunter & William Rubenstein eds., 1992).
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any treatment will not be beneficial to the particular child, govern-
mental consent to such experimental treatments is problematic.
IX. TARGETING
Another extremely difficult issue has been raised in the devel-
opment and administration of our AIDS policies-the issue of
targeting. The economic impossibility of universal, identified test-
ing or even of large-scale identified testing of low-prevalence
groups, and the consequent necessity of targeting in any such test-
ing, are still further reasons why mandatory testing is unacceptable.
There is an alternative: universal, anonymous testing. Some
states have tested all infants on an anonymous, unidentified basis,
thereby compiling useful data about the incidence of AIDS.' 0 2 It is
not the universal testing itself that is economically impossible but
the post-test counseling. In addition, pre-test counseling imposes
very large costs when informed consent is required. Anonymous,
unidentified testing avoids these costs and can be administered even
universally, 10 3 but those tested also do not obtain treatment
benefits.
Universal identified testing for HIV infection, where those
tested will learn of their status and have opportunities for treatment,
could not work efficiently.104 Indeed, any large-scale identified test-
ing of low-prevalence populations is unlikely to work. Money spent
in such testing would be much better spent in some other way to
fight the AIDS epidemic.
The experience in Illinois, when the state required AIDS testing
as a precondition to obtaining a marriage license, illustrates this
point. The Illinois statute required that both members of a couple
be informed of either one's HIV status, but it did not prohibit mar-
riage based on a positive result.'0 5 During 1988, the program's first
102. See, e.g., Lawrence Feinberg, D.C. to Test Newborns, Clinic Patients for AIDS, WASH.
POST, Aug. 18, 1988, at D5 (noting a District of Columbia plan to conduct mass, anony-
mous testing for AIDS of all infants born in the city during one month, as part of a
federally financed, multistate program to track the spread of the disease); Robert Stein-
brook, State Proposes Anonymous Testing of Infantsfor AIDS, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 15, 1988, at 1
(noting similar testing in California and New York).
103. See Conversations with Dr. Husson, supra note 82.
104. See Price, supra note 3, at 446 (noting that universal testing might be "a method-
ology for ensuring precise and accurate data on the developing epidemiology of the
disease" but admitting that "[r]ealistic proposals, however, are targeted at specific
populations"); H. Rutherford Turnbull, III et al., Mandatory AIDS Testing for Persons with a
Developmental Disability in Residential Facilities, 39 U. KAN. L. REV. 585, 602-03 (1991)
(finding universal testing "inappropriate" as "both under and over inclusive").
105. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, para. 204(b) (Smith-Hurd 1934 & Supp. 1992).
1993] 433
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
year in existence, only one in 7000 people tested was found to be
HIV positive, at an estimated total capital cost of $5.6 million. °6
This translated into a cost of $243,000 in order to identify each per-
son testing HIV positive through that program. 0 7 The effect of the
Illinois law, and the fact that the cost of the testing was passed on to
the individuals who were tested,' 08 discouraged some people from
marrying at all, and encouraged others to marry out of state.'0 9 Af-
ter a year and a half, Illinois repealed the statute." 0
There is no evidence that pregnant women have any higher per-
centage of AIDS than the general population. There is no reason to
think mandatory testing of that group would be any more effective
than the mandatory premarital testing in Illinois. When politicians
argue otherwise, it is invariably for political reasons, not for any real
health care objective. Accordingly, even when a statute provides for
mandatory testing of pregnant women, as does the Florida stat-
ute, "' in practice it is applied only to so-called high-risk groups."12
106. Telephone Interview with JeffJohnson, Legislative Liaison, Illinois Department
of Public Health Uan. 20, 1989).
107. Id. The Chicago Tribune estimated the cost at $228,000 per positive test result.
Repeal the Premarital AIDS Test Law, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 6, 1989, at 18, col. 1. (editorial).
108. While the average cost per test was $35, the Illinois Department of Health has
anecdotal information that physicians were charging as much as $125 for testing and
certification. Interview with JeffJohnson, supra note 106.
109. See Field, supra note 24, at 75-76.
110. Daniel Egler & Rick Pearson, Premarital AIDS Test Law Repealed, CHI. TRIB., Sept.
12, 1989, at 1, col. 5.
Because universal identified testing does not work in the area of AIDS research, and
because it wastes money, almost no programs attempt it or force testing on low-preva-
lence populations. The exception is the United States military, which has, by far, the
largest HIV testing program in the world. It spends hundreds of millions of taxpayer
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Centers for Disease Control, Prevalence of Human Immunodeficiency Virus Antibody in U.S.
Active-Duty Military Personnel, Apr. 1988, 37 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 461
(1988).
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112. Such discrimination in application is unconstitutional to the same extent as if the
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PREGNANCY AND AIDS
Targeting high-risk groups for mandatory testing makes more
sense economically than universal mandatory identified testing, but
brings with it problems of its own. In the context of pregnancy, the
groups who would be targeted would be poor and minority popula-
tions living in the inner cities of a few metropolitan areas, because
those are the groups of women where the concentration of HIV in-
fection is the highest." l3 Targeting by such socioeconomic criteria
is common in the context of AIDS, but it is also highly discrimina-
tory.'14 Targeting poor women of color is unjust for many reasons.
First, huge personal costs can accompany testing. Moreover, while
race, geography, and socioeconomic status do define the group of
women that currently has the highest HIV prevalence, none of those
factors is the "fault" of the women in the group, and most of the
group is not and never will be HIV infected. To impose mandatory
testing only on this group not only encourages a false sense of se-
curity in other women regarding their risk of infection, but also un-
fairly and inaccurately labels the targeted women as "sources of
contagion.,"1 5 It is difficult to justify adding such stigma to a group
who is already oppressed.
Given the high cost of testing low-prevalence populations of
pregnant women and the discrimination inherent in testing targeted
groups of pregnant women, the better way to combat vertical trans-
mission of HIV is through education, counseling, and prenatal
care." t 6 Many women, including a great many in groups most vul-
nerable to AIDS, either receive no prenatal care or none until late in
pregnancy." 7 There is no question that, because of both AIDS and
the interest in newborns' health generally, prenatal care should be
made available to all pregnant women, and information concerning
AIDS should be offered in conjunction with it.
Questions concerning targeting have also been raised apart
from testing or other government coercion. There is concern about
targeting even in connection with providing information, education,
counseling, and even free voluntary testing. If government concen-
113. Over 72% of the women in the United States who have AIDS are either black or
Hispanic, while only 19% of all U.S. women are black or Hispanic. Centers for Disease
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note 31, at 2419.
115. Id.; see also Field, supra note 24, at 61-63.
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117. See GEORGE WASH. UNIV., 1 INTERGOVERNMENTAL HEALTH POLICY PROJECT AIDS:
A PUBLIC HEALTH CHALLENGE 2-2, 2-28 (M. Rowe & X. Ryan eds., 1987).
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trates its outreach efforts on particular groups, the same risk exists
of government branding those groups as "sources of contagion."
At the same time, it is understandable that government would want
to use its limited resources to benefit those most in need. Of
course, it would be best to educate and inform everyone and to pro-
vide free and voluntary testing to all who desire it."l ' But where
that cannot be done, targeting, though problematic, is considerably
less troublesome when applied to outreach efforts that do not in-
volve coercion.
Any such targeting that occurs should be undertaken with great
care to avoid stigmatization to the extent possible. Moreover, it is
important that sound epidemiologic research-not simply racial or
social class prejudice-guide which populations will be targeted." 19
CONCLUSION
Vertical transmission of AIDS is a serious problem, but
mandatory testing, either of pregnant women or of newborns, is not
the appropriate solution to try. Not only does it violate established
rights of pregnant women or mothers of newborns to test without
their consent. It also would be counter-effective to societal efforts
to control the spread of HIV. Coercion does not work in this con-
text. Those who urge coercive methods are frequently motivated by
political or self-interested rather than health objectives, or are
moved by panic concerning the AIDS epidemic rather than a rea-
soned and informed response. The grave concern that the AIDS
epidemic justifiably causes should not be the occasion for imposing
new coercive controls on pregnant women, on parents of newborns,
or on others.
We must not lightly abandon well-established standards of in-
formed consent in a panicked response to the AIDS epidemic. Nor
should we abandon our tradition that decisions concerning the ap-
propriateness of childbearing belong to parents and not to the state.
Altering such fundamental principles in the context of the AIDS cri-
sis would contribute nothing to controlling the epidemic. The
thoughtless adoption of such a course would, in addition, have seri-
ous repercussions throughout our jurisprudence and our society.
118. Working Group on HIV Testing of Pregnant Women and Newborns, supra note
31, at 2416-17.
119. See Robert M. Wachter et al., HIV Testing of Pregnant Women and Newborns, 265
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